An issue was discovered on Alecto IVM-100 2019-11-12 devices. The device comes with a serial interface at the board level. By attaching to this serial interface and rebooting the device, a large amount of information is disclosed. This includes the view password and the password of the Wi-Fi access point that the device used.
b42befc858b86f3d8819791d933601caf73d18c43fef25ac1bf48bd2f453056cAn issue was discovered on Alecto IVM-100 2019-11-12 devices. The device uses a custom UDP protocol to start and control video and audio services. The protocol has been partially reverse engineered. Based upon the reverse engineering, no password or username is ever transferred over this protocol. Thus, one can set up the camera connection feed with only the encoded UID. It is possible to set up sessions with the camera over the Internet by using the encoded UID and the custom UDP protocol, because authentication happens at the client side.
30be5b3d8a4c41b0bd80dbb9c3ff49c1407c5db44ff864668aaab8728b0c851dAn issue was discovered in Luvion Grand Elite 3 Connect through 2020-02-25. Authentication to the device is based on a username and password. The root credentials are the same across all devices of this model.
91634b6551f1c4552fd199be2e464137398cb4b429f2c78d26995a771a12cc5eAn issue was discovered in Luvion Grand Elite 3 Connect through 2020-02-25. Clients can authenticate themselves to the device using a username and password. These credentials can be obtained through an unauthenticated web request, e.g., for a JavaScript file. Also, the disclosed information includes the SSID and WPA2 key for the Wi-Fi network the device is connected to.
c1840a21faea62a36c6bc7e40c57e0e5b17eba2135cb46888a2b4014361ad916An issue was discovered on Sannce Smart HD Wifi Security Camera EAN 2 950004 595317 devices. The device by default has a TELNET interface available (which is not advertised or functionally used, but is nevertheless available). Two backdoor accounts (root and default) exist that can be used on this interface. The usernames and passwords of the backdoor accounts are the same on all devices. Attackers can use these backdoor accounts to obtain access and execute code as root within the device.
657ac530d2693dc4d1d5836de1dbd822079a8d222c079df2445c9b8a2d90f78dAn issue was discovered on Sannce Smart HD Wifi Security Camera EAN 2 950004 595317 devices. A local attacker with the "default" account is capable of reading the /etc/passwd file, which contains a weakly hashed root password. By taking this hash and cracking it, the attacker can obtain root rights on the device.
0565814322a8c520d48233f4208f575674bdcaee0dd5d4f8a76504f93a015dd4An issue was discovered on Sannce Smart HD Wifi Security Camera EAN 2 950004 595317 devices. A crash and reboot can be triggered by crafted IP traffic, as demonstrated by the Nikto vulnerability scanner. For example, sending the 111111 string to UDP port 20188 causes a reboot. To deny service for a long time period, the crafted IP traffic may be sent periodically.
6ec2dd61152dfc79f755826cd417ef76f9308483fefb98de18929d3fc231ad62An issue was discovered on Sannce Smart HD Wifi Security Camera EAN 2 950004 595317 devices. By default, a mobile application is used to stream over UDP. However, the device offers many more services that also enable streaming. Although the service used by the mobile application requires a password, the other streaming services do not. By initiating communication on the RTSP port, an attacker can obtain access to the video feed without authenticating.
850c930ab6136aac773a8e8414bf0c0de76c080804cb4d19d853a1e3a6ae67e2An issue was discovered on Sannce Smart HD Wifi Security Camera EAN 2 950004 595317 devices. It is possible (using TELNET without a password) to control the camera's pan/zoom/tilt functionality.
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